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1. Introduction 
 
The existence of inter-industry wage differentials is a well-documented 
phenomenon in the literature.
 1 As shown by Edin and Zetterberg (1992) 
and Arai (1994), in Sweden, there appears to be significant differences in 
wage levels between industries when characteristics of individuals and 
firms are controlled for. A less investigated question is how industrial wage 
differentials are related to trade performance? From a Swedish perspective 
this is an issue of particular interest, since Swedish manufacturing is 
exposed to intensive import competition and at the same time depends 
highly on exports to international markets. 
The aim of this study is mainly to analyze the effects of international 
trade on the inter-industry wage structure in Swedish manufacturing in the 
late 1990s. More specifically, controlling for individual, firm and industry 
characteristics, we investigate how international trade affects on inter-
industry wage structure through both export competitiveness and import 
penetration. We focus on the impact of international trade, and we also add 
controls for the distinguishing features of Swedish product and labor 
markets. 
In our analyses we make use of a unique matched employer-employee 
dataset for the period 1996 to 2000. It contains detailed information about 
worker characteristics, the firms that employ them, and the industries to 
which the firms belong. With such a detailed dataset we expect the 
measures of inter-industry wage premiums to be more accurate than in 
earlier studies that have been carried out at more aggregate levels. 
To preview of our results, we find that industries that face intensive 
import competition from low-income countries have lower wage premiums. 
Surprisingly, the wage premiums are not related to how export-oriented the 
industries are. Finally, technical progress, measured by investment in R&D 
activity, appears to enhance inter-industry wage premiums. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses theoretical 
issues, while section 3 briefly reviews the relevant literature. Section 4 
introduces the dataset and the empirical strategy. Section 5 contains 
discussions of the estimation of inter-industry wage premiums and the 
impact of international trade. Section 6 concludes. 
 
                                                 
1 See Dickens and Katz (1986), and Krueger and Summers (1986, 1988) for the US, 
Gera and Grenier (1994) for Canada, Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1999) for a 
comparison between the US and Germany, and Abowd and Kramarz (2000) for a 
comparison between the US and France.  
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2. Theoretical  background 
 
Firms and industries pay different wages to workers with different levels of 
human capital and competence as reflected in, for instance, education and 
experience. But one may ask why some firms and industries choose to pay 
more than others for the same type of workers? A necessary condition for 
that is the existence of some rents to share. For instance, in the presence of 
excess market power among producers in the product market, higher wages 
may be paid to workers as a form of rent sharing.
2 
Given that firms have the opportunity to pay non-competitive wages, the 
efficiency wage literature offers some economic reasons why such behavior 
might be profitable and increase productivity: (1) minimization of the 
turnover costs, (2) motivation on workers’ efforts, (3) enhancement of 
workers’ loyalty, and (4) selection on workers with high quality. 
In general, international trade models support the view that trade 
liberalization and/or increased economic integration generate income 
redistributions among different types of labor with different qualifications. 
However, when production factors are mobile across industries, as 
predicted in a standard Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model, factor prices 
will be equalized across industries. The industrial wage differences for the 
same type of workers will disappear. 
On the other hand, in the specific-factor model, where workers, e.g. due 
to various frictions, are assumed to be immobile across industries, changes 
in real wages depend on whether the workers are in industries in which 
prices rise or fall.
3 An increased degree of internationalization through 
declining trade barriers and trade costs in all sectors should result in falling 
prices in import competing industries and increasing prices in exporting 
industries. These price changes thus lead to higher wages in the exporting 
industries and lower wages in the importing industries. In other words, 
winners and losers are distinguishable by the industry affiliation of workers 
instead of by the type of workers. Empirical evidences from the labor 
economic literature provide some support for labor immobility. Helwege 
(1992) shows that skills that have been accumulated over time might be 
firm- and industry specific and make workers less mobile. This is 
particularly true for senior and more experienced workers. 
 
                                                 
2 The monopoly-wage hypothesis implies that workers share excess profits of firms in 
concentrated industries (Weiss 1966). 
3 According to OECD’s country survey in 2004, Swedish workers are more inclined to 
stay in the same job than what their counterparts in other OECD countries seem to be.  
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Technical progress has, in the specific-factor model, similar effects as price 
changes, i.e. wages are growing faster for workers in industries with high 
rates of technical progress. Technical progress may be induced through 
innovation efforts, e.g. by expenditure on R&D. To the extent that R&D 
activities pass-through to industrial wages, we would expect higher wages 
in R&D intensive industries. 
Finally, we should notice that the specific-factor model assumes perfect 
competition on both product and factor markets. Imperfect competition, 
therefore, opens up additional channels through which international 




3.  Some previous empirical studies 
 
The first study to examine the inter-industry wage structure in Sweden is 
Edin and Zetterberg (1992). They compare their results for Sweden with 
Krueger and Summers’ study (1987, 1988) for the US. Their analysis 
indicates that the magnitude of inter-industry differentials at the one-digit 
level is much smaller in Sweden than that for the US. They also show that 
most of the observed industry wage differentials in Sweden are due to 
differences in labor quality and other non-pecuniary conditions. In contrast 
to Edin and Zetterberg (1992), the findings by Arai (1994) exhibit 
substantial inter-industry wage differentials in Sweden at the two-digit 
level, even when unmeasured worker-characteristics and working condition 
are controlled for. 
Most of the empirical studies investigating inter-industry wage structure 
are found in the labor economics literature, while the empirical evidence of 
the impact of international trade obtained by combining information on 
individuals with firm- and industry- level data is still rather scarce. 
Katz et. al. (1989) address industry wage differentials in the light of   
active industrial policy in the US. They use detailed data of individual 
characteristics and trade data at the industry level. Their results suggest that 
the workers in export-intensive sectors enjoy higher wage premiums, while 
the workers in import-intensive sectors have lower premiums. This is 
particularly true for the industries within the manufacturing sector. Grey 
(1993) examines wage premiums and trade performance for Canadian 
manufacturing industries at the three-digit level for 1985. He finds that 
Canada experienced similar influences of trade on inter-industry wage 
premiums as in the US. 
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Abowd and Kramarz (1999) examine the impact of international trade and 
mobility of French workers on wage premiums using individual 
information and international trade data for the period 1986-1990. They 
find that imports at the firm level have negative effects on wages. Salvanes 
et al. (1998) use matched employer-employee data for Norway in the 
period 1991-1995. After controlling for conventional individual human 
capital variables and job characteristics, they find that a higher degree of 
openness gives higher wage premiums. 
A new strand of literature examines how trade reforms have affected 
industry wage premiums in developing countries. Goldberg and Pavcnik 
(2001) investigate the impact of trade reforms on the industry wage 
structure in Colombia in the 1980s, while Pavcnik et al. (2003) do the same 
for Brazil in the 1990s. According to the study on Colombia, the 
relationship between trade protection and wage is negative without industry 
fixed effects, while the reverse relationship is true when industry fixed 
effects are included. However, no significant statistical link between 
changes in industry wage premiums and changes in trade policy is found in 
the study on Brazil. 
In short, most of the earlier studies conducted by using matched 
employer-employee data have found evidence supporting the positive 
effect of exports and the negative effect of imports on inter-industry wage 
premiums. In the case of Sweden, however, the previous studies have dealt 
with pure labor economic issues and have used data from the 1970 and 
1980s. In this study, we employ more detailed data from the late 1990s and 





4.  Data and empirical strategy 
 
The data used for this study are from Statistics Sweden and have been 
compiled into a microeconomic database at the Trade Union Institute for 
Economic Research (FIEF). The information on individuals is based on a 
representative sample for the Swedish economy. Since we only have trade 
data for manufacturing, we constrain the dataset to contain individuals 
working in the manufacturing sector. It is a matched employer-employee 
dataset to which structural characteristics at the industry level are added. 
In the administrative wage register, every employee has a personal code 
and an employer code. In the first step of matching, the employer code is 
used to match to the employee in the financial accounts of his/her main  
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employer. The employers comprise all Swedish manufacturing firms with 
more than 20 employees.
4 The data employed in our study contain full and 
part-time manufacturing employees aged 16 and older. Multiple job-
holdings are excluded from our analyses. In the second step of matching, 
the employee and firm-level information has been linked to industry-level 
data by matching the classification codes of industry in both the 
administrative wage register and the financial accounts of enterprise. We 
obtain then a panel of the Swedish manufacturing for the period 1996-2000 
in which there are, for each year, between 373,881 to 432,625 employees 
and in between 945 and 1,327 firms.
5 
We measure the wages by taking logarithms of real monthly wages. The 
consumer price index with 1990 as the base year is used as a deflator. The 
wages for the part-time employees are recalculated up to the full-time 
employment by taking account of hours worked. This adjustment is made 
by Statistics Sweden. 
In the empirical analyses, we follow the two-stage industry wage 
premium estimation developed by Krueger and Summers (1988) and 
further refined by Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997). We first regress 
individual wages on a set of characteristics of individuals and firms and a 
set of industry dummy variables.
6 A baseline industry is dropped as a 
reference group and we assume that the omitted industry has zero wage 
premium and estimate a standard ordinary least square (OLS) regression. 
Having obtained the estimated coefficients on the industry dummies, i.e. 
the wage premiums, we make a linear transformation and re-normalize the 
estimated industry premiums and adjust the standard errors accordingly. 
We use employment share of each industry as weights. The normalized 
wage premium thus can be interpreted as the proportional difference in 
wage for an average worker in a given industry relative to an average 
worker in all manufacturing industries with the similar observable 
characteristics.
7 As discussed in Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt (1997), this 
improved procedure provides a more meaningful economic interpretation 
of the coefficient that measures deviation from an overall average rather 
than from a base category. Following the Haisken-DeNew and Schmidt 
                                                 
4 We use 20 employees as a cut-off point because information of both production and 
export are incomplete for the firms that have less than 20 employees in our dataset. 
5 During the period of 1996-1999, the individual workers are matched with their main 
employers within the private sector only. For 2000, the employer codes are available for 
both the private and the public sectors, and hence the numbers of individuals and firms 
for this year are larger in comparison to the figures for the previous period. Appendix 
1.1 gives more detailed information on the panel. 
6 Appendix 1.2 provides detailed definitions of these variables. 
7 We use the approximation log point as percent throughout this paper.  
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(1997) procedure, we employ the exact formula to compute both adjusted 
and weighted standard deviations of transformed inter-industry wage 






5.  Empirical specification and results 
 
The empirical analyses are divided into two parts. In Section 5.1, we 
estimate inter-industry wage premiums on an annual basis for the period 
1996 to 2000. Having obtained the adjusted measures of inter-industry 
wage premiums, in Section 5.2, we estimate the impact of international 
trade on the wage premiums.
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5.1  Estimation of industry wage premiums 
 
We obtain the industry-specific wage premiums by estimating the wage 
equation: 
 
ijk k k jk f ijk i ijk DI wp Firm Individual w ε β β + × + + = ln              (1) 
 
where i is the index for the individual, j is the index for the firm and k is the 
index for the industry and the variables are defined as the following: 
 
ijk w ln : The log of average monthly wage deflated by the consumer price 
index. 
ijk Individual : A vector of characteristics of individuals, such as age, gender, 
educational level and profession. 
jk Firm : A vector of characteristics of firms, such as firm size, capital 
intensity, technology, and profitability. 
                                                 
8 The coefficients of the industry dummies are restricted so that their sum, weighted by 
the industry employment shares in the sample, equals zero. Thus, each coefficient 
indicates approximately the percentage of wage difference between an employee in a 
given industry and the average employee in all industries. The weighted and adjusted 
standard deviation of the coefficient is calculated as:  )). * ( ´( ´ * *) ´(( ´ ) ( ˆ b V w b b w s ν υ β + =  
9 Goldberg and Pavcnik (2001) and Pavcnik et al. (2003) apply a similar method to 
evaluate the effects of trade reforms in Brazil and Colombia using micro data. 
  
  7  
k DI : A set of three-digit manufacturing industry-dummy variables, which 
indicates individual i’s industry affiliation. 
We estimate Equation (1) with OLS. Standard errors are adjusted for both 
heteroskedasticity and potential dependency among individuals in the same 
industry at the three-digit level. The industry wage premiums thus capture 
the part of variation in wages that cannot be explained by measurable 
individual and job characteristics, but can be affected by an individual’s 
specific industry affiliation. 
Table 1 reports the results of the cross-sectional estimations of 
regression Equation (1). The standard demographic and human capital 
variables yield similar results as in previous labor studies. Male workers 
receive, on average, 10 percent higher wages than female workers indicated 
by the positive and significant coefficients on gender. Using age as a proxy 
for experience reveals that experience involves higher wage, but at a 
decreasing rate. The education variables at different levels have positive 
and significant effects on wages. The size of the coefficients is increasing 
with the education level, indicating that each successive increase in 
education gives a positive return. Moreover, we control for professional 
categories by using a standard classification of occupations at the one-digit 
level. Owing to the multicollinearity between education and profession, 
only some of the estimates on profession are individually significant. 
  In our wage equation, we take also employer characteristics into 
account, such as firm size, capital intensity, relative total factor 
productivity (TFP) and profitability. Both firm size and capital intensity 
estimates provide clear-cut evidence that larger firms and firms with higher 
capital intensity pay higher wages. The coefficients on these two variables 
are highly significant and positive for the whole period. The coefficients on 
firm size are at the range of 1.1%-2.4%, while the coefficients on capital 
intensity are at the range of 2.2%-3.4%. Unlike earlier labor studies, we 
introduce an explicit measure of technology, namely the relative TFP. The 
relative TFP intends to capture technology advantages and superior 
management skills of the firms. The estimates on relative TFP, as we 
expected are positive and significant, and at the range of 5%-17%. 
Furthermore, we include profitability of the firms as a control variable.
10  
                                                 
10 In order to avoid the instability in the profit measures, we use an average profit over a 
three-year interval. For year 1996, the profit measure is computed as the average profit 
for year 1994, 1995 and 1996. Similarly for year 1997, we use the average for year 
1995, 1996 and 1997, etc. The endogeniety between wage and profit is often addressed 
in rent-sharing literature. Since we do not explicitly model the rent-sharing mechanism, 
but use profitability as a control variable, this potential endogeniety problem is not 
explicitly addressed here.  
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Table 1.  Cross-section estimations of wage premiums, 1996-
2000 
 
Dependent variable: Monthly real wage in logarithm 
  1996  1997 1998 1999  2000 
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Observations 317962  316421  299761 329178  347353  
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Notes:  Standard errors are adjusted both for heteroskedasticity and potential 
dependency among individuals in the same industry at 3-digit. White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in brackets. 
 
The coefficients on profitability are unstable, which suggests that the 
positive effect on wage of profitability is not as clear-cut as in other labor 
economic studies.
11 
  In the labor economics literature, particularly in studies using firm-level 
data, the choices of control variables are often open empirical issues. To 
check the robustness of our preferred specification in Table 1, we 
experiment with including the firm’s market share and with employing an 
alternative profitability measure. The results of these exercises are reported 
in Appendix 2. 
In some previous studies (e.g. Salvanes et al. 1998), market share is 
included to control for firms’ market power or efficiency. As shown in 
Table A2.1 in Appendix 2, the positive effect of market share on wage is 
not clear-cut. Another consequence of including market share is that the 
coefficients on the relative TFP become smaller and less significant in 
comparison to the original specification of the wage equation. When we 
add firm size, the coefficients on market share become insignificant.
12 
These results indicate that there seems to be muliticollinearity among firm 
size, market share and relative TFP. Therefore, we choose the most 
parsimonious specification that excludes firms’ market shares. 
The other experiment we carry out is to use an alternative profitability 
measure, the logarithm of profit per employee, which is the most 
conventional measure of profitability in the labor economics literature, and 
exclude the TFP variable from the model. As shown in Appendix 2 Table 
A2.2, the coefficient on profitability is still not significant in every year. 
Another possible determinant of wage premiums is the ownership 
structure. As a robustness check, we include foreign versus domestic and 
private versus public ownership dummy variables in the model. The results 
show that coefficients on ownership are not statistically significant and the 
estimates on other control variables remain unaffected when ownership is 
controlled for. Hence, we exclude the ownership controls from our 
specifications.
13 
 To summarize, we have taken both relevant individual and job 
characteristics into account in the estimations of industry-specific wage 
                                                 
11 Arai (2003) and Heyman (2001) are two examples of such studies using data on 
Swedish firm and individuals. 
12 For brevity, the result that includes firm size is not presented, but is available upon 
request from the authors. 
13 The results with ownership controls are available at request from authors.  
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premiums. We find that the estimates are robust to these modifications of 
the specifications. Nevertheless, two empirical issues need to be discussed 
before we look at the estimates of the industry-wage premiums in more 
detail, namely unmeasured labor quality and compensation differentials. 
  It is often argued that labor quality cannot be adequately controlled for 
since non-measurable labor quality differences (such as motivation and 
innate ability) may vary systematically with industry and might then be 
picked up by industry-level variables instead of by human capital controls. 
This methodological issue is addressed in several previous studies by using 
fixed-effect estimates in the context of panel data instead of cross-sectional 
estimation. However, this solution is not without potential problems. At 
first, methodologically, it can only be applied to the individuals who switch 
industries. The most obvious drawback is that individuals do not switch 
across industries randomly. It causes therefore endogeneity bias in the 
estimation (Gibbons and Katz 1992). Furthermore, selection bias and 
measurement errors emerge immediately with such approaches. 
Theoretically, the expected number of industry-switchers may not be large, 
since in the short run labor is assumed to be immobile. Moreover, a number 
of recent studies show that the mobility of labor is more common across 
firms within the same industry than across industries. 
The compensating wage differential argument means that since working 
conditions vary systematically across industries, different wages are paid to 
compensate employees for that. If such differences in working condition 
across industries are not taken into account, they may generate bias in the 
estimated wage premiums. The evidences from previous studies, e.g. 
Murphy and Topel (1987) and Krueger and Summers (1987), show that 
industry wage differentials in the US are robust after controlling for various 
working conditions. The dataset in this study does not offer any possibility 
to take various working conditions into account. However, the findings in 
Arai (1994) of substantial industry premiums in Sweden are not affected by 
the inclusions of variables controlling for working conditions and 
individual fixed effects. 
The number of industries in Table 1, where we use the three-digit level 
industrial classification codes, is between 76 and 85 depending on the year 
of calculation. To give a more direct impression and a better overview of 
the magnitude of estimated wage premiums, we estimate the same model as 
in Table 1 employing two-digit level industry dummies. Table 2 presents 
the results. 
  Table 2 shows that the overall variability of the industry wage premiums 
at both the two-digit and the three-digit levels has a decreasing pattern. The  
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convergence of wage premiums, indicated by declining standard deviations 
between 1996 and 2000, is clearer at the three-digit level. 
 
 
Table 2.  Industry wage premiums (two-digit level), 1996-2000 
 
Sector  1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 
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Table 2.   (continued)   
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Overall variability of 
industry wage coefficients 
(two-digit) 
0.013  0.007 0.007 0.009 0.005 
Overall variability of 
industry wage coefficients 
(three-digit) 
0.010  0.009 0.009 0.007 0.006 
Number of observations  317962  316421 299761 329178  347353
Adjusted R
2  0.52  0.48 0.49 0.53 0.57 
F statistics for no 
 industry effect  
(two-digit industry) 
 



























Notes: The control variables at the individual- and the firm levels are the same as in the 
3-digit industry specification. 
 
 
Furthermore, the wage premiums are in general higher in some industries, 
e.g. pulp and paper (SNI21), office and computers (SNI30), radio, 
television and communication equipment (SNI32), medical and precision 
instrument (SNI33) and motor vehicles (SNI34). For instance, an average 
worker in the pulp and paper industry has 2.6 percent higher wage than an 
average worker in the whole manufacturing in 1996. In other industries, 
such as wearing apparels (SNI18), chemicals and chemical products (SNI 
24), rubber and plastic products (SNI25) and other non-metallic mineral 
product (SNI26), the wage premiums are generally lower. An average 
worker in rubber and plastic products industry has, for example, 3.5 percent 
lower wage than an average worker in the whole manufacturing in 1996. 
Table 3 uses year-to-year correlations between wage premiums over the 
whole period to check the stability of the wage structure. As shown in 
Table 3, the year-to-year correlations range from 0.86 to 0.73.
14 In Arai 
(1994), the correlations between wage premiums are 0.91 for 1968 and 
1974, 0.63 for 1968 and 1981 and 0.62 for 1974 and 1981 for a sample of 
non-agricultural workers. Krueger and Summers (1988) report that industry 
wage premiums have a correlation up to 0.91 in the period 1974 to 1984 in  
                                                 
14 Similar results are obtained for unadjusted wage premiums as well.  
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Table 3. Correlations of inter-industry wage premiums over 
time 
 
   wp1996   wp1997   wp1998   wp1999   wp2000 
  wp1996  1.0000  - - -  - 
 wp1997  0.7902  1.0000  -  -  - 
 wp1998  0.7278  0.8590  1.0000  -  - 
  wp1999 0.6338 0.7298 0.7314 1.0000  - 
  wp2000 0.5510 0.6265 0.7210 0.8021  1.0000 
 
Notes: The table presents the adjusted wage premiums. The correlations are statistically 
significant at 1% level. 
 
the US. Roberson (1999) reports a correlation of 0.92 for the period 1987 to 
1997. It is difficult to compare the correlations in various studies since 
different measures of wages for different samples are used. The correlation 
may also be sensitive to the time period and the sectors that are 
investigated. In our study, the yearly correlations of the inter-industry 
wages premiums appear to be relatively low.The relatively low correlations 
of the inter-industry wage premiums over time may suggest that industry 
wage structure reflects some transitory effects of the short-run demand 
shocks in a combination with limited mobility of labor. Hence, in the next 
step we relate the inter-industry wage premiums further to international 
trade as a potential source of such demand shocks. 
 
 
5.2  Wage premiums and international trade  
 
In this section, we assess the impact of international trade on industry wage 
premiums, controlling for domestic competition and technology progress. 
The transformed inter-industry wage premiums,  k wp  from Section 5.1 over 
time are pooled as the dependent variable. Since the dependent variable in 
this stage is the estimate from Equation (1), the inverses of the adjusted and 
weighted variances of the wage premium coefficients are used as weights 
to deal with potential measurement errors. This procedure thus puts more 
weights on industries with smaller variances in industry premiums. In other 
words, the model is estimated by applying the weighted least square 
estimator (WLS).
15 
                                                 
15 See e.g. Goldberg and Pavcnik (2001).  
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The model is specified as the following: 
 
2
1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 2 & Im − − − − − + + + + = t k h t k h t k rd t k ex t k im kt H H D R Export port wp β β β β β  
+ kt k k t t DI DY ν δ δ + +                                                                     (2) 
 
where  kt port Im  and  kt Export are lagged import penetrations and lagged 
export ratios at the three-digit industry level.  1 , & − t k D R  and  1 , − t k H are 
lagged average R&D intensity and the Herfindahl index at the three-digit 
industry level.  1 , & − t k D R  is a proxy for technical progress and  1 , − t k H  is a 
proxy for domestic competition.
16  t DY  is a vector of year dummies and 
k DI  is a set of industry dummies at the three-digit industry level. 
Alternatively, we divide imports into high- and low-income country groups 
to assess the differential effects of imports from different origins on wage 
premiums.
17 
The export- and import flows depend on factor prices and are potentially 
endogenous. Furthermore, there might be simultaneity problem between 
wages and technical progress. In the absence of valid external instruments, 
we use one-year lagged trade variables and lagged industrial R&D intensity 
in the estimation to avoid the potential endogeneity problems. One may 
alternatively employ a two-stage least squares (2SLS) method and use the 
lagged values of variables as instruments.
18 However, current and lagged 
values of these variables often reveal to be serially correlated and relatively 
persistent over time. Hence, the potential endogeniety problems may still 
lead to biased results, particularly in the specifications with relatively small 
number of observations (Shea 1997). 
Table 4 reports the results from estimations of Equation (2). We estimate 
the model both with and without industry fixed effects. We regard the 
specifications without industry fixed effects as the preferred ones. We are 
interested in the inter-industry differences in wage premiums, but not 
within-industry variations of wage premiums over time.
19 Methodolo-
gically, there are a relatively large number of industry dummy variables 
                                                 
16 Table A1.2 in Appendix 1 contains more detailed variable definitions. 
17 The country classification into high- and low-income countries is shown in the 
Appendix in Lundin (2003). 
18  We experiment with the 2SLS estimations, which yield similar results as in Table 4. 
The results are available on request. 
19  When industry-dummies are included in regressions, which are equivalent to fixed 
effects, the effects of the explanatory variables on inter-industry wage premiums 
disappear. The alternative estimation results are available on request.  
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included in the model (more than 70 industries) and the time period of the 
study is relative short (4 years after lagging the trade variables). Both of 
these factors prevent us from obtaining efficient and consistent estimates of 
the effects of trade and technology when a large number of industry 
dummies are included. Furthermore, we experiment with estimating the 
model by using between and first-difference estimators as robustness 
checks. Between estimators that use the cross-sectional information yields 
similar results as the WLS estimator.
20 The first-difference estimator is an 
alternative way to control for unobserved time-invariant industry-specific 
effects. For similar reasons, this estimator turns out to be inefficient as in 
the industry fixed effects estimation.
21 The discussion in the subsequent 
part focuses on the results obtained by WLS instead of the industry fixed 
effects estimation. 
As shown in Table 4, column 1, the coefficient on lagged total import 
penetration is insignificant, whereas the estimate on lagged total export 
ratio is positive and significant at l0% level. When lagged total import 
penetration, in column 2, is divided into import from low- and high-income 
countries, the lagged import penetration from low-income countries shows 
a negative and significant effect on the inter-industry wage premiums. 
However, the coefficient on total export ratio then becomes insignificant. 
Furthermore, as pointed out in the theoretical background in Section 2, 
both imperfect competition and technical progress may also affect the inter-
industry wage structure. Thus, the models in columns 3 and 4 are further 
extended to include the industrial technical progress (R&D intensity) and 
market concentration (Herfindahl index). Like in column 2, the negative 
effect of lagged import penetration from low-income countries on the inter-
industry wage premiums remains significant. Also, there is a positive effect 
of industrial R&D intensity, while market concentration seems to have no 
significant effect. 
 
                                                 
20 Since we use the inverses of the adjusted and weighted variances of the wage 
premium coefficients as weights to deal with potential measurement errors in the 
weighted least square (WLS) estimation, we regard the WLS as a preferred estimator. 
The between estimator yields similar results, but the measurement errors cannot be 
handled properly as in the WLS. 
21 The results of between-effect and first-difference estimators are available on request 
from the authors.  
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Table 4.   International trade and inter-industry wage premiums, 
1996-2000 
 
Dependent variable: Adjusted industry wage premiums, wp 









































Lagged R&D intensity 
 



















Herfindahl x Herfindahl 
index 
 






Year dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Industry dummies 
(3-digit) 
No No  No No No No 
VIF
22 1.79  1.74  1.66  1.65  3.46  3.28 
Adjusted R
2  0.04 0.14  0.05 0.13 0.13 0.20 
Number of observations  370  370  370  370  370  370 
 
 
The specific factor model can be used to explain these results. At first, we 
examine the effect of import penetration from the low-income countries. 
When import competition from the low-income countries intensifies in the 
domestic market, it imposes a downward pressure on the prices that the 
domestic industries face. The lower prices (and also the lower relative 
prices) of import goods lower the revenues of domestic firms in the import 
competing industries. Thus the profits may be pressed downwards and even 
become negative. In this situation, the firms have to either contract by 
laying off workers or lowering the wages in order to eliminate their losses. 
Given that workers are assumed to be immobile − at least in the short-run − 
across industries and skills are industry specific, it is not easy to find a new 
job in another industry and lower wages become the final outcome. 
                                                 
22 VIF stands for variance inflation factor. As a rule of thumb, VIF values greater than 
10 need further investigation of collinearity problem in the model. 
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Alternatively, the workers may try to shift to another firm in the same 
industry. This is mainly due to the fact that it is difficult to shift across 
industries. In this case, the worker still has to accept a lower wage as he/she 
is still in the same industry that faces intensified import competition. This 
negative effect of imports from low-income countries is consistent with the 
results of the studies by Katz et al. (1989) for the US and Grey (1993) for 
Canada. 
In our study we do not observe such negative effects on wages imposed 
by imports from high-income countries. A reason might be that imports 
from low-income countries often are homogenous goods and the 
competition is mainly based on prices, while the imports from high-income 
countries to a large extent, consist of highly differentiated products and the 
competition is based on quality rather than on price. 
We now look at the export side. When the relative prices of export goods 
rise or the domestic industries achieve a competitive position in exporting 
markets, the firms in exporting industries receive increased revenues from 
sales in international markets. Thus, initially profits among these firms rise. 
The increase in profits stimulates the expansion of production. Since the 
firms in exporting industries, at least in the short-run, cannot expand their 
productions by attracting workers from other industries, they have to 
compete, initially, for workers who are already present in the industry. 
Accordingly, the competition among firms within exporting industries 
pushes up wages in these industries. However, we do not, in contrast to 
other similar studies, observe such positive effects of exports on the 
industry-wage premiums in our analyses. 
The impact of trade explained by the specific factor model is under the 
assumption of perfect competition. In order to control for the effect of 
domestic competition, we specify a non-linear relationship between 
industry wage premiums and domestic concentration by including 
Herfindahl index in columns 5 and 6. Opposite to most of the earlier 
empirical studies, we find a negative relationship between concentration 
and industry wage premiums.
23 This can be interpreted as that large 
employers may exercise monopsonistic power. Furthermore, if the 
concentrated sectors are affected under import competition, the loss of 
excess profit may also lead to decreases in wages.
24 However, the negative 
effects of market concentration appear to be at a decreasing rate, indicated 
by the significantly positive coefficients on the squared Herfindahl index. 
                                                 
23 Belman (1988) gives a detailed survey on agreement and disagreement on the effect 
of market concentration on wages. 
24 This hypothesis has been tested in Lundin (2003) on Swedish manufacturing for the 
period 1990-1999.  
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This reveals a U-shaped curve relationship between concentration and 
wages premiums. Within a certain interval of concentration level, the 
relationship is negative. However, when the concentration ratio reaches a 
higher level and passes a certain threshold, a positive relationship emerges. 
As shown in columns 3-6, the positive effects of the average R&D 
intensity (as a proxy for technical progress) reflect the fact that technical 
progress has the same effects as price changes, i.e. increasing the price 
(wage) of the specific factor (labor) in industries with high rate of technical 
progress.
25 
The wage structure may be influenced by the institutional factors as well. 
For the Swedish labor market, the high rates of union participation and 
collective bargaining are important institutional features. First, the union 
participation ratios in Sweden are uniformly high across industries and 
persistent over time. The variation in the union participation variable is 
very limited. Second, the Swedish labor market is indeed characterized by a 
high degree of centralization in the wage setting but permits the industries 
and firms to have a substantial degree of local influence on wage 
determinations (Arai 1994 and 2003). This implies that the influence of the 
wage bargaining system takes place also through local wage negotiations 
within industries. These factors may explain why the union effect cannot be 
identified at an aggregate level in our study.
26 Furthermore, the unions in 
Sweden are organized not only at the firm- and industry levels but also on 
the basis of education levels and professions. It requires therefore, more 
detailed information on union participation at both the firm- and the 
industry levels and distributions of union participation at various education 
levels to identify potential union effects. Unfortunately, the information of 
these two aspects is not available for this study. 
Finally, some additional robustness checks of the model specifications 
have been done.
27 We include, for instance, the growth rate of employment 
in order to control for the effect of the demand for labor. However the 
coefficient on employment growth is not statistically significant. 
Macroeconomic demand effects are probably picked up by the year dummy 
variables in Equation (2). Also, we include the average skill-intensity as an 
additional control for the aggregate effect of skills, which is often 
                                                 
25 We use also average labour productivity as robustness measure for technology and 
the results using this measure are very similar to the R&D intensity. We use therefore 
R&D intensity as a more direct measure for technology progress. 
26  Although we experiment with inclusion of union participation rates at the two-digit 
industry level, we do not find any significant union premiums. See Heyman (2002) for a 
discussion on this point. 
27  Results from these alternative specifications are available on request from authors.  
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emphasized in the labor economic literature. However, this effect is not 
significant. It may imply that the aggregate skill effect has been captured 
by the R&D intensities, which can be regarded as a more direct measure of 






This paper aims to investigate trade-wage links in the Swedish 
manufacturing. At first, we estimate the inter-industry wage dispersion and 
then we analyze how international trade affects the inter-industry wage 
structure. 
The first part of the analyses reveals substantial dispersion in inter-
industry wage premiums after controlling for important human capital 
variables and characteristics of employers. These results provide evidence 
supporting both imperfect labor mobility and transitory demand shocks 
have affected on the wage structure in Swedish manufacturing. 
Nevertheless, the overall variability of wage premiums has decreased 
during the period 1996 to 2000. 
In the second part of the analyses, we relate the inter-industry wage 
premiums to competition from abroad, as well as to domestic competition 
and technical progress. Consistent with most of the wage-technology 
literature, we find clear-cut evidence indicating that industries with higher 
technological level, measured by R&D intensities, enjoy higher wage 
premiums. Regarding international competition, we observe lower wages in 
import competing industries. Nevertheless, the producer concentration 
shows a non-monotonic effect on wage premiums.  
To summarize, based on our results we conclude that the inter-industry 
wage premiums appear to be related to international competition, 
technology and market imperfection. In the context of increased 
international competition, labor mobility plays an important role both in 
reduction of short-run adjustment costs and in enhancement of 
productivity. Hence, the results of our study may have some labor market 
policy implications. The legislation on the labor market faces a challenge 
that on the one hand, it needs to provide job security, and on the other 
hand, it should also facilitate the labor mobility and ensure that workers 
may move to jobs where they can be more productive and earn a higher 
return for their skills. The results of this study suggest further that trade 
with low-income and high-income countries may have different effects on 
the inter-industry wage structure. This is probably due to the different  
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technical standards and skill endowments in the trade with these two 
subgroups. It implies that there might be some skill bias related to the 
effect of trade on wages. For instance, high-skilled and low-skilled labor 
may be affected in different ways, although they are both in an import 
competition industry. This interaction between trade and skill calls for 
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Appendix 1  Data description 
 







of industries (3 digit) 
1996 373,681  945  76 
1997 400,271  960  81 
1998 381,262  958  80 
1999 390,187  989  78 
2000 432,625  1327  85 
Total number of observation: individual – year: 1,978,026. 
 
 
Table A1.2  Variable description 
 
Variables Descriptions 
  Individual Characteristics 
Gender  Gender=1, man; Gender=0, woman. 
Age  Age = Current year minus year of birth. 
Education1 
– Education 6 
Edu1: Education before-secondary school, less than 9 year. 
Edu2: Education before-secondary school, 9 years. 
Edu3: Secondary education.  
Edu4: Post-secondary education, less than 2 years. 
Edu5: Post-secondary education, 2 years and more.  
Edu6: Post-graduate education. 
Profession 1-9  Profession 0: Armed forces. 
Profession 1: Legislators, senior officials and managers.  
Profession 2: Professionals. 
Profession 3: Technicians and associate professionals. 
Profession 4: Clerks. 
Profession 5: Service workers and shop sales workers. 
Profession 6: Skilled agricultural and fishery workers. 
Profession 7: Craft and related trades workers. 
Profession 8: Plant and machine operators and assemblers. 
Profession 9: Elementary occupations. 
Monthly real 
wage 
Log (nominal monthly wage*100/ consumer price index), 
1990 as base year. 
 Firm  Characteristics 
Firm size  Log (average employment).  
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Ratio of book-value capital stock to employment 
 (based on 1990’s price). 
Market share  Ratio of  firm’s sales to  industry’s sales at 3-digit level. 
Profitability  Profitability1 = (Return to capital t-2 +  
Return to capitalt-1 + Return to capitalt)/3. 
Profitability2 = [log (real accounting profit / employment)t-2+ 
log (real accounting profit / employment)t-1+ 
log (real accounting profit / employment)t]/3 
Relative TFP  Relative TFPt = TFP for firm i /average TFP in industry k. 
 See Hansson and Lundin (2003) for details on the 
 calculations of TFP. 
 Industry  Characteristics 
Import 
penetration 
Ratio of import to consumption. 
Export ratio  Ratio of export to total turnover. 
Herfindahl 
index (H) 
Sum of squared of market share at 3-digit level. 
R&D intensity  Ratio of R&D investment to total turnover.  
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Appendix 2  Additional results 
 
 
Table A2.1  Robustness specification 1: Market share 
 
            Dependent variable: Monthly real wage in logarithm 
























































































Professions  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        Firm-level control variables 












































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.53 0.48 0.50 0.54 0.57 
Observations  317962 316421 299761 329178 347353 
 
Notes:  Standard errors are adjusted both for heteroskedasticity and potential 
dependency among individuals working in the same industry at 3-digit. White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in brackets. 
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Table A2.2  Robustness specification 2: ln(profit/employee) 
 
Dependent variable: Monthly real wage in logarithm 
























































































Professions Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
        Firm-level control variables 


































Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R
2  0.54 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.58 
Observations 264172 253668 242492 256433 281968 
 
Notes:  Standard errors are adjusted both for heteroskedasticity and potential 
dependency among individuals working in the same industry at 3-digit. White’s 
heteroskedasticity-consistent t-statistics are in brackets. Working Paper Series/Arbetsrapport 
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